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2012-09-22 19:23 |
文章原文来自外交家：http://thediplomat.com/pacific-money/2012/09/18/the-dangers-of-a-china-japan-trade-war/
译文来自译言网：http://article.yeeyan.org/view/350328/320456#comment
译者：翻译尽量做到客观，不偏不倚。虽然旁观者未必清，但多数当局者一定迷，中国人也需要知道外媒的意见。我只希望能尽己之所能，翻译各种评论文章，希望更多的人能以更全面的角度来看钓鱼岛冲突，这也算是我表达爱国情感的一种方式。
由于尖阁列岛/钓鱼岛争端，最近抵制日货的示威游行席卷了中国大大小小的城市，包括北京、深圳、洛阳、西安。贴着日本牌子的产品，包括许多汽车（乃至于抗议者自己的一个照相机）都受到了狂怒的示威人群的攻击毁坏。据报道，像松下、本田、尼桑这样的日本的品牌，其商业不动产（一个工厂，还有各自的汽车经销商）都受到了破坏。佳能公司已经关闭了一些设施，同时，日本的服装品牌优衣库也选择关闭一些分店，而还在营业的店铺，也要将商标遮掩起来。抗议者也将愤怒的目光锁定在了中国人经营的日本品牌的产品——抗议者给消费者留下的形象，挫伤了市场中潜在顾客的积极性。同时，一些日本抗议者也在号召消费者抵制日货。
抵制日货具有破坏性。这也反映出了，拓展海外业务自身所固有的一定程度上的政治风险——这绝不是仅限于中国。政治风险这方面因素确实很棘手，但是随着中国市场愈显重要的影响力，“中国特色的政治风险”必须被接纳且成为商业大环境的一部分。读者必须谨记先前的几轮反日游行。2010年的反日游行，还有2008年因为西藏不安定以及奥运火炬事件，而发起的针对家乐福和麦当劳的抗议。在全球化的世界，强势品牌、以及其logo（商标），经常被用来代表一个国家，就像是大使馆、国旗一样。如果一个大品牌在外国市场成功运营，他们可能实际上也处在危险的政治分歧的前沿地带，而这是他们所无法掌控的。
消费者的抵制抗议可以采取各种方式，也可以针对各种事情。在欧洲、美国，当不道德行为被察觉，公司损害公平的行为被发现，或是出于安全考量，或是针对发展中国家、严重污染记录而采取行动，或是有虐工事件揭露，抵制抗议就会产生。试举一例，在20世纪90年代晚期，便出现了针对雀巢的抵制抗议。还有更加著名的例子，那便是因为劳工问题，而发起的对耐克的抵制抗议。
即使是北京方面对日本并未公开表示采取何种经济举措，但接下来的几个月日本公司要想在中国好好做生意，似乎不大显示，日本公司估计要经历一场寒冬了。从中国媒体来看，正式的举措似乎将要出台。由于中国占到日本出口的接近20%，中日贸易局势危如累卵。但是，中国还在WTO的约束之下，贸然采取某种举措显得有些棘手，更怕有损大国形象。2010年限制对日本出口稀土以达到对日本的惩罚的目的，就是一个更极端的国家层面抵制的例子，但是后续的反弹却让中国深受其苦。除了家庭消费、国家政策层面上的抵制，中国还有更强力的第三种选择。
考虑到国有企业的权力，以及经济体中占更大比重的公共部门，非官方的抵制在中国是可能的。由于WTO规则的制约，官方正式宣布某种措施很困难，所以要对使中国不悦的国家还有企业的贸易采取行动，就要采取其他方式。比如采取网络浏览限制，例子便是中国大陆的彭博社，还有事牵国有公司但并未向民众公开的政策（有许多报道称，彭博社终端在中国的销量骤然跌落）。
事实上，德国的哥廷根大学的两个专业学者，出版一份讨论稿，文章着眼于讨论：当外国安排了同达赖喇嘛的官方会面，从而激怒北京方面，进而会对两国贸易造成何种影响。文章的作者福斯和克朗，通过确定的模型，发现该国对中国的出口会下跌8.1%或者16.9%（取决于计量方法），而且在这个事件平息之后的两年内，经济都将保持低迷状态。他们的研究还发现，重机械业、交通运输设备制造业，是一贯深受“非官方”抵制打击的部门。不用说，在中国的这些部门牵涉到许多国有的参与者（关系到交通和基础设施建设的发展）。
但是，尽管中国在全球经济中的影响力与日俱增，抵制消费的行为却是把双刃剑，双方都会受到伤害。当各国的公司，目睹日本在内地和香港成为众矢之的，看到家乐福和麦当劳在中国的遭遇，便会考量思忖中国政治不确定性所带来的风险，待对各处细节了然于心之后，其投资决定也会受到风险成本因素影响。如果保险费上升，一个公司的成本随之增加，即使关门一两周，对公司而言也是不好的。
外国公司为中国提供了就业，也缴纳赋税，还为中国消费者提供了他们所喜爱的产品。而且，日本的消费者也购买了中国制造的产品。针锋相对的抵制行为对双方都有害，许多公司（不仅是日本公司）考虑过要在中国投资，可能现在不得不三思而另做打算。众所周知的是，早在一战开始之前各国牢固的经济关系独立于战争之外，并不会配合战争而自行停止，各国的经济关系也不能受损。而我们希望，在这个敏感的时期，更为冷静的头脑能够占据舆论的上风。
译者：虽然从经济学的角度分析来说，抵制日货确实有一定作用，尤其是在中国出于各种顾虑无法对日本实施经济制裁的情况下，这也是政府一边放任游行、一边劝导理性爱国的部分原因。而日本现在的股市也是很好的一个证明。但是中国人并不能只看到抵制日货给中国带来的短期利益（如果有的话），中国应该从长远考虑，因为世界各国的眼睛都在盯着中日两国。
钓鱼岛是要争的，但我们需要理性，而不是化玉帛为干戈。
Protests against the Japanese purchase of the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands took place in various Chinese cities recently, including Beijing, Shenzhen, Luoyang and Xi’an amongst others. Japanese branded products, including numerous cars (and even a camera belonging to a protestor) were attacked and destroyed by the angry crowds. Panasonic and Toyota as well as Nissan reported damage to commercial properties (a factory and car dealerships respectively). Canon has also closed some facilities whilst Japanese clothing chain Uniqlo chose to shut several locations, and covered signs at others. Protestors have also targeted Chinese owned Japanese branded products - images of which cannot be encouraging for prospective customers. Meanwhile, some Chinese protestors are calling for consumer boycotts of Japanese branded products.
Consumer boycotts can be damaging and reflect a level of political risk inherent in doing business in foreign markets – they are by no means limited to China. This aspect of political risk is troublesome, but with the growing importance of China’s market, “political risk with Chinese characteristics” must be accepted as part of the business environment. Readers may remember previous rounds of anti-Japanese protests in the mid-2010s, as well as the targeting of Carrefour and MacDonald’s branches in 2008 in response to instability in Tibet and the Olympic torch protests. In a globalized world strong brands and their logos are often taken to represent a country as much as its embassies or flag. If a large brand is operating successfully in a foreign market, they may effectively be on the front-lines of disagreements over which they have no control.
Consumer boycotts can take various forms and be over various issues. In Europe and the U.S., they often occur over perceived immoral or unjust actions by companies, including safety concerns, actions in developing countries, poor environmental records, and the mistreatment of workers. Examples of these could be the boycotts against Nestle in the late 1990s and the more famous protests against Nike over its labor practices.
Japanese companies can expect a certain chill whilst doing business in China over the coming months, even if Beijing doesn’t take any public formal economic action against Japan. The Chinese media has been suggesting that formal action may be in the cards, and with China accounting for nearly 20% of Japan’s exports, there is a lot at stake. However, such measures can be troublesome under World Trade Organization (WTO) obligations and tend to damage a country’s reputation. The punishment of Japan through rare-earth export restrictions in 2010 is an example of the more extreme national level action, but the backlash against China was damaging. Other than private consumer led boycotts and formal national policy boycotts, however, China has a powerful third option.
Unofficial boycotts are possible in China because of the power of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and the wider public sector in the economy. Without announcing formal measures which are difficult given WTO rules, there has been a documented effect on trade and sales from nations as well as corporations which have displeased China. This can be in the form of web restrictions such as that currently affecting the free Bloomberg website in mainland China (after Bloomberg published a damaging expose on Xi Jinping’s extended family wealth) or in unpublished policies at state companies (there have been reports that sales of Bloomberg Terminals have plummeted in China).
In fact, two academics at the University of Goettingen in Germany published a discussion paper looking at the effect on trade when a foreign country angers Beijing by arranging official meetings with the Dalai Lama. Fuchs and Klann, the paper’s authors, find a definite pattern whereby a country’s exports to China will fall by 8.1% or 16.9% (depending on method of measurement) and will remain depressed for two years after such an event. The paper finds that heavy machinery and transport equipment are the sectors most consistently hit by such “unofficial” boycotts. Needless to say, these sectors in China involve many state owned players (transport and infrastructure development).
Yet despite China’s growing clout in international economics, the boycott/consumer action sword can cut both ways. Whilst Japan is the current target of action in the mainland and Hong Kong, companies from all nations are being made more aware of the particularities of political risk in China – and will also remember the recent experiences of Carrefour and MacDonald’s. Investment decisions are affected by risk, and a company’s costs are increased if insurance premiums rise. Even shutting down facilities for a week or two is damaging to a corporation.
Foreign firms do provide employment in China and also pay taxes, as well as deliver products which Chinese consumers usually seem keen to own. What’s more, Japanese consumers buy Chinese made products too; a tit-for-tat boycott war will harm both sides, and many companies (not just Japanese ones) considering investment in China may now be looking at other options. It is now well known that strong economic relationships before WWI didn’t stop the march to war, but they can’t have hurt. Let’s hope that cooler heads will prevail. |
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